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Abstract 
This paper aims to investigate the difference in average first-day return on initial public 
offerings (IPOs) between the “cold issue” market of 2010-2013 and the “hot issue” market of 
2014-2016 on the Swedish IPO market. IPOs during the hot issue market were subject to an 
average first-day return of 16.57 % compared to 6.02 % during the cold issue market. Among 
other theories and hypotheses trying to explain such swings in first-day returns over time, the 
changing risk composition hypothesis has been tested for in this thesis. Our results do not 
provide evidence that a larger fraction of riskier IPOs can serve as an explanation to the higher 
average first-day return in the hot issue market. However, looking into alternative potential 
explanations, we found that IPOs related to the information-technology industry could be 
central to the difference in average first-day returns.  
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I.! Introduction 
Commencing in January 2014, the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) skyrocketed and 
the number of firms being floated 2014 beat the old record from 2000 (Affärsvärlden TT, 2014). 
This record did not hold for long; even more firms decided to go public the following year 
(Wrede, 2015). The wave continued in 2016, however, no records were broken. Still, in terms 
of the number of offerings the Swedish marketplaces were the most active in Europe 
(Cederblad, 2016). Illustrated in Figure 1 below, in comparison to the period between 2010 and 
2013, the number of IPOs almost tripled during 2014 to 2016. Moreover, each year in the later 
period were subject to far more IPOs than each year in the earlier period. Thus, since January 
2014 until December 2016, we find ourselves in something that can be described as a hot issue 
market.  
Hot issue market refers to certain periods where IPO activity is subject to anomalies, more 
precisely the IPO market moves in cycles. According to Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter 
(1984), in comparison to cold issue markets, hot issue markets are periods over time with more 
IPOs and/or higher underpricing (calculated as a percentage change using the offer price of the 
Figure 1. Sample-Number of IPOs per Year 
The sample includes IPOs listed on Nasdaq Stockholm, First North and Aktietorget. Listings that are 
not considered as “real” are excluded: spinoffs, parallel listings, firms that changed list, reverse 
mergers, mergers and preferred stock IPOs. Unit IPOs, REITs IPOs and IPOs classified as missing 
(relevant data could not be obtained) are also excluded. The sample size is 241 IPOs for 2010-2016. 
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new issue and the closing price on the initial day of trading). Ritter (1984) also observed that 
these hot issue markets featured larger proportions of smaller IPOs and concentrations of IPOs 
in specific sectors. In a more recent study, Ritter (1991) found that these hot issue markets are 
characterised by overoptimistic investors also, and therefore riskier firms take advantage of 
these “windows of opportunities.” Recognising that the Swedish stock market reached an all-
time high in 2015 (Trading Economics, n.d.), this is also coincident with the tendency of the 
abnormally high floating during market peaks, which was discovered by Loughran, Ritter and 
Rydqvist (1994).  
 
The Underpricing Phenomenon 
The process of going public is mainly about putting a value on the firm, which further implies 
deciding on the number and setting the price on the shares that will be on issue. Moreover, this 
evaluation is usually associated with a high level of uncertainty. Once the decision of going 
public has been made by the firm, the subsequent step is to contact an underwriting firm. This 
entity will cooperate with the issuing firm which involves the task of valuing the shares that 
either will be issued or sold by current owners. To determine an appropriate price, the 
underwriter engages in several activities. The first day of trading, comparing the offer price 
with the closing price, will reveal if the stock was mispriced or not. It can either be underpriced, 
overpriced (or remain the same), where the former refers to a positive first-day return and the 
latter a negative first-day return. A lot of research within the area of IPOs have been conducted 
on the price of the shares. Research shows that IPOs are underpriced on average and that 
underpricing fluctuates over time and most of the studies have been conducted on the U.S stock 
market (Ritter & Welch, 2002). 
 
There are various theories trying to explain the underpricing phenomenon and these theories 
can be categorised into four branches: asymmetric information models, ownership and control, 
institutional explanations and behavioural reasons (Ljungqvist, 2007, p. 378). Central to this 
thesis is Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse. This theory tries to explain underpricing by information 
asymmetry, and it assumes that underpricing is explained by the investor demand side of the 
IPO transaction. Briefly, investors are divided into uninformed and informed. Having better 
information, informed investors only bid on IPOs perceived as attractively priced, conversely, 
uninformed bid indiscreetly. Therefore, uninformed investors are subject to a winner’s curse. 
And depending on the magnitude, uninformed investors may pull-back from the IPO market 
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and in order to guarantee a well-functioning IPO market, Rock (1986) argues that it relies on 
the participation of these. Thus, underpricing (in expectation) occurs as an equilibrium 
condition to elicit the demand of the uninformed investors. An implication of this model, 
introduced by Ritter (1984) and later formalised by Beatty and Ritter (1986), is the ex ante 
(prior) uncertainty regarding the value of an IPO. Ritter (1984) found a positive relation 
between risk and first-day return. Beatty and Ritter (1986) demonstrated that underpricing is 
expected to increase the greater is the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the issuing firm. 
An extension to these theories is the the changing risk composition hypothesis. During periods 
where the proportion of riskier IPOs (IPOs subject to more uncertainty) is larger than in other 
periods, the changing risk composition hypothesis predicts that average underpricing should 
increase during these periods (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). In addition, for this hypothesis to hold, 
the positive relation between risk and first-day return should be stationary (Ritter, 1984) 
(Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
 
Investigating why average underpricing has increased over time, Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
demonstrated that riskier IPOs could account for a small portion of this change. Even though 
Ritter (1984) could not conclude that the changing risk composition hypothesis could serve as 
an explanation to the abnormal underpricing during the hot issue market of 1980, Ritter (1984) 
found some evidence that this hot issue market included more high-risk offerings. Hence, in 
both papers, the underpricing during the abnormal periods were too high to be explained solely 
by the changing risk composition hypothesis.  
 
Purpose Formulation 
The sample period ranges from 2010 to 2016 and this period is further divided into two sub-
periods based on the number of IPOs. The first sub-period covers January 1 2010 to December 
31 2013 and is referred to as a cold issue market, whereas the other sub-period comprises 
January 1 2014 to December 31 2016 and is referred to as a hot issue market. In addition, 
pursuant to hot issue market characteristics, an assumption that the hot issue market would be 
subject to higher average underpricing was made. Collecting the necessary data needed to 
calculate the average level of underpricing, we found that this assumption holds. IPOs in 2014-
2016 were underpriced on average by 16.57 % compared to 6.02 % concerning the cold issue 
market. This comparison in underpricing is not as definite as in other studies, for instance Ritter 
(1984), nevertheless, the difference is pronounced. 
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Even though the empirical research and literature on IPO underpricing is now seemingly mature 
and extensive in general (Ljungqvist, 2007, p. 380), the understanding of the dramatic changes 
in the extent of underpricing over time is not clear-cut, e.g. Loughran and Ritter (2004) and 
Ritter and Welch (2002). This may be one reason to why underpricing is still mysterious and 
referred to as one component of the so-called “IPO puzzle” (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013, p. 820).   
 
Inspired by “Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?” (Loughran & Ritter, 2004) and 
“The Hot Issue Market Of 1980” (Ritter, 1984), the purpose of this paper is to examine the 
apparent difference in underpricing between the two sub-periods. In order to do so, the paper 
will answer to if the higher average IPO underpricing in the hot issue market of 2014-2016 can 
be attributed to the changing risk composition hypothesis. Thus, the research question is:   
 
"! Using firm characteristics as proxies for ex ante uncertainty, can the changing risk 
composition hypothesis explain the difference in the level of underpricing between the 
cold issue market and the hot issue market on the Swedish IPO market?  
 
If 2014-2016 were subject to a larger fraction of riskier IPOs, then the risk composition of firms 
going public have changed over time and by theory this may explain the higher underpricing. 
In order to partially or entirely attribute the higher average underpricing in the hot issue market 
to the changing risk composition hypothesis, these following criterions should be satisfied:  
 
1.! A larger proportion of riskier IPOs in 2014-2016 than in 2010-2013. 
2.! A positive relation between risk and first-day return in both sub-periods and in the entire 
sample period. 
3.! The positive relation between risk and first-day return is stationary at all points in time, 
i.e. when comparing both sub-periods. By stationary, no fluctuations in this relation are 
allowed. 
 
Starting off with a cross-sectional and a longitudinal study, and then moving into a regression 
analysis, we will examine the above criterions. The prediction, in terms of results, is that the 
difference in average underpricing can be attributed to the changing risk composition 
hypothesis to some extent. Furthermore, a stationary positive relation between risk and first-
day return is expected. 
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Structure of Paper 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II, Theoretical Framework, presents a 
theoretical background in the context of this study. Going forward, section III covers data and 
methodology. In section IV, Results and Analysis, we report and analyse the cross-sectional, 
longitudinal and regression results. Thereafter, in section V, Potential Biases and Robustness, 
we address certain issues to our regression model. In the last section VI, Conclusions, we 
summarise our findings and present our conclusions. References and appendices are provided 
at the end of the paper.   
 
II.! Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework in this study is introduced by winner’s curse. Serving as an 
implication of winner’s curse, the section continues with ex ante uncertainty regarding the value 
of an IPO, and finally, the section ends with the changing risk composition hypothesis which 
follows from these theories.  
!
Asymmetric Information and Winner’s Curse 
In the context of underpricing, asymmetric information refers to a situation in which the parties 
involved in an IPO transaction possess different knowledge (Ljungqvist, 2007, p. 384). 
Generally, the three involved parties are the issuing firm, the underwriter and the investors. A 
well-established model used as an explanation to underpricing within this field is Rock's (1986) 
winner’s curse. Rock (1986) separates investors into two groups, uninformed and informed, 
where a few informed investors are assumed to have better information about the true value of 
an IPO than uninformed investors. The issuing firm and its underwriter is also assumed to be 
uniformed. Investors become informed by investigating the issuing firm's value, and this is 
costly. If IPOs are underpriced on average, e.g. (Ritter & Welch, 2002), even though a large 
proportion of IPOs are overpriced, there is an underlying incentive to incur these costs in order 
to pick out potential underpriced IPOs. However, far from all investors will commit, rather 
uninformed investors attempt to free ride on behalf of the informed investors (Beatty & Ritter, 
1986). 
 
Having superior information, informed investors participate only in IPOs perceived as 
attractively priced and, in contrast, uninformed investors bid on all IPOs (Rock, 1986). Owing 
to this, uninformed investors are subject to a winner’s curse; in bad offerings, they are allocated 
6 
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the total number of shares they have subscribed for, while in attractive offerings, their 
allocations become rationed. In other words, if being allocated the total number of requested 
shares, investors will face a first-day return expected to be below the average underpricing 
return (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). 
 
In worst case scenario, they are rationed to the extent that they earn breakeven or even 
experience negative returns. When expected returns are negative on average, uninformed 
investors will not subscribe to IPOs, resulting in an issue market consisting exclusively of 
informed investors. Rock (1986) argues that the total demand of the informed investors in the 
IPO market is insufficient to meet the supply of new shares. Thus, the IPO market relies on the 
participation of the uninformed demand. This implies that uninformed investors are only willing 
to bid on IPOs if first-day returns are expected to be non-negative. Therefore, to guarantee the 
participation of uninformed investors, Rock (1986) concluded that all IPOs must be underpriced 
(in expectation). Moreover, by incurring the cost related to investigating issuing firms’ future 
prospects, informed investors are compensated for this through underpricing.  
 
Ex Ante Uncertainty 
At the heart of Rock's (1986) winner’s curse, is the uncertainty about the true value of the 
issuing firm, where informed investors are more certain about this value than uninformed 
investors. Since riskier firms are more difficult to evaluate, which in turn makes becoming 
informed costlier (more thorough investigations), Rock's (1986) model suggests that riskier 
IPOs should be underpriced more than less risky IPOs. An implication of this model, introduced 
by Ritter (1984)1 and later formalized by Beatty and Ritter (1986), is the ex ante (prior) 
uncertainty regarding the value of an IPO. Trying to explain the occurring hot issue market 
covering 15 months beginning in January 1980, Ritter (1984) found a positive relation between 
risk and first-day return. Beatty and Ritter (1986) later conducted a study more specifically 
focused on the ex ante component as a determent of the level of underpricing. They show that 
underpricing is expected to increase the greater is the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the 
issuing firm. This positive relation is formalised and explained by the number of investors who 
decide to become informed, which consecutively set the required first-day return. Beatty and 
Ritter (1986) provide the following example. The choice of investing in a call option on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Notice: the years used in the references are somewhat deceptive here. Just to make clear, Rock’s publication in 1986 is 
based on his earlier unpublished Ph.D. dissertation from 1982 (Why new issues are underpriced) which we do not have 
access to. Ritter (1984) is referring to this paper. 
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IPO is equal to the decision of becoming informed. The call option is exercised only if the after-
market price transcends the strike price (offer price). All else equal, the greater the risk (the ex 
ante uncertainty), the higher the value of the call option. More fundamentally, the greater the 
ex ante uncertainty the more investors become informed. However, when the number of 
informed investors increases, the winner’s curse problem worsens worsens which leads to 
higher required underpricing. In other words, the greater the risk of the IPO the more is there 
to lose. Being aware of this and to still participate in the IPO market, uninformed investors 
require higher levels of underpricing in offers subject to more uncertainty.  
 
In order to test for ex ante uncertainty, adequate proxies for uncertainty (risk) must be used. 
Common proxies are firm characteristics, offering characteristics, post-IPO variables or 
information found in prospectuses (Ljungqvist, 2007, p. 387). For instance, Ritter (1984) used 
the most recent annual sales (firm characteristics) prior to the IPO as well as the standard 
deviation (post IPO variables) of the first-day returns post IPO. Beatty and Ritter (1986) used 
number of uses of proceeds given in the prospectus and gross proceeds (offering 
characteristics).    
 
The Changing Risk Composition Hypothesis 
This theory is closely related to Rock’s (1986) model and ex ante uncertainty, in that 
underpricing occurs due to risk. Although, it is different in that it is rather used trying to explain 
swings over time where underpricing is more severe in some periods than others. Moreover, 
the changing risk composition hypothesis can be viewed as an extension to the theories 
mentioned above. Recall that Rock's (1986) winner’s curse and ex ante uncertainty predict that 
riskier issues are expected to generate higher first-day returns than less risky issues (Ritter, 
1984). If there are periods where the proportion of riskier IPOs is greater than in other periods, 
the changing risk composition hypothesis assumes that the average underpricing should 
increase during these periods (Loughran & Ritter, 2004).  
 
This can be illustrated in a graph (see Figure 2 below) where the Y-axis represent underpricing 
and the X-axis represent risk (Ritter, 1984). High-risk offerings are found more to the upper 
right part of the graph, conversely, low-risk offerings are found to the lower left. The hypothesis 
argues that both risk categories will be plotted on the same risk-underpricing line. Thus, the 
positive relation between risk and expected first-day return is shown with an upward sloping 
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line. In other words, as the risk increases the greater is underpricing. This implies that periods 
consisting of a larger fraction of riskier IPOs should be subject to a higher average level of 
underpricing, because a larger fraction of the total number of IPOs are clustered more to the 
right of the risk-return line.! Potentially, this could serve as an explanation for higher 
underpricing in hot issue markets. In addition, the positive relation between risk and first-day 
return is assumed to be stationary (Ritter, 1984) (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). Hence, if the slope 
or line shifts over time, the change in underpricing cannot entirely be attributed to the changing 
risk composition hypothesis.  
!
Figure 2. Illustration of the Changing Risk Composition Hypothesis 
H denotes high-risk IPOs and L denotes low-risk IPOs. 
 
In attempt to explain why IPO underpricing has changed over time, Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
used age, assets, sales and industry (firm characteristics) to measure the significance of the 
changing risk composition hypothesis. Recognising that this theory coincides with ex ante 
uncertainty, the proxies used when investigating the latter theory is obviously applicable for the 
changing risk composition hypothesis as well. As aforementioned in the section covering ex 
ante uncertainty, Ritter (1984) used sales and standard deviation. Notice that, the higher the 
value of assets and sales and the older the firm, the less risky is the firm. The same implication 
applies for standard deviation of first-day returns, where lower standard deviation entails lower 
risk. 
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III.! Data and Methodology 
This section is divided into five parts. It covers the taken approach, descriptions and 
explanations of made delimitations, how the sample and sample period were selected and 
constructed and the chosen variables used in our study and which sources that were used to 
collect the data. Lastly, we present how the study is being conducted, how the results are 
reported and how the criterions are examined. 
!
Quantitative Approach 
The decision to use a quantitative research method is mainly due to the nature of the data that 
is needed to answer the research question and to fulfil the purpose of this paper. With 493 
observations, the collection process was relatively extensive. Adding that this type of data is 
compatible in statistical sense, this should clearly motivate the choice of a quantitative 
approach. More general advantages with this method are that it facilitates replication of the 
study and that the study itself will be based on objective sources.  
  
Delimitations  
Listings that are not considered as “real” IPOs are excluded in this study. Such exclusions 
involve spinoffs, parallel listings, firms that changed list, reverse mergers, mergers and 
preferred stock IPOs. Spinoffs is the activity of creating a new independent firm through 
distribution of new shares of a subsidiary from the parent firm (Cusatis, 1993). Parallel listings 
and change of list is fairly straight forward, the firm is listed on a foreign exchange, or has 
changed from one list to another. Obviously, these issues are excluded since the firms have 
been listed prior to the “IPO”. It should be mentioned that one spinoff and four firms that 
changed list were included in the sample. The former issued new shares in conjunction to its 
listing. The so-called list changers, previously listed on Alternativa Aktiemarkanden, (a trading 
platform for unlisted companies (Alternativa Aktiemarknaden, n.d.)) were still privately held. 
In addition, they issued new shares in conjunction with their list change. In both cases we were 
able to obtain a price on the shares being offered, therefore, these firms are treated as “real” 
IPOs and included in the sample. 
 
Reverse merger refers to the process of when the owners of a privately held company uses its 
shares in exchange for shares in a public company, which is a way for private firms to go public 
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], 2011). We also encountered one firm who 
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went public as part of a merger with one already listed firm. Both types of listings were excluded 
since these firms can generally go public without resorting to an IPO. Preferred stock IPOs are 
also excluded in this study. This is due to the different class of ownership imposed on these 
issues (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013, p. 810) and the lower assumed trading activity.  
 
Consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2004), further exclusions are unit IPOs (offers where a 
stock and a warrant is combined (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1997)) and REITs (real estate 
investment trusts). They lack an explanation to why they are excluded, however, it should be 
quite straight forward. Regarding unit offers, the listing price, often seen as the price per share 
in the unit, may not represent the “real” value due to not accounting for the warrant. Briefly, 
compared to ordinary firms, REITs serve as an investment vehicle for actual real estate 
investments and they can be seen more as mutual funds (SEC, 2016). We have also suffered 
from “missing” IPOs. These observations are classified as missing if they have been delisted, 
resulting in that trading data no longer is available, or if we could not obtain an offer price. 
Finally, out of total 493 observations, 218 are excluded given our selection criteria and 34 is 
missing. 
 
Sample Selection and Sample Period 
The sample includes IPOs listed on Nasdaq Stockholm, First North and Aktietorget which are 
the three larger exchanges in Sweden, with Nasdaq Stockholm being the largest. Even though 
these are the larger exchanges, the firms being listed differs significantly, for instance, in terms 
of size and risk. Therefore, by selecting all three exchanges, our sample consists of a variety of 
IPOs in terms of firm characteristics. Adjusted for our selection criteria and IPOs classified as 
missing, we are left with a sample of 241 IPOs. The sum of the sample (241), unit IPOs (24), 
REITs (9) and the IPOs classified as missing (34), 308, are somewhat deceptively referred to 
as the “real” number of IPOs. Thus, the “loss” of data, i.e. unit IPOs, REITs and IPOs classified 
as missing, 67, make up to 22 % of the number of “real” IPOs.  
 
The sample period, January 1 2010 to December 31 2016, is divided into two sub-periods. The 
first sub-period ranges from January 1 2010 to December 31 2013 and the second ranges from 
January 1 2014 to December 31 2016. These periods were determined using the principals of 
cold and hot issue markets by looking at the number of new offerings for each year between 
2010 and 2016 (Ritter, 1984) (Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975). Observing this data, we found that the 
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number of issues are relatively low between 2010 and 2013, and then more than tripled between 
2013 and 2014. This number increased even further throughout 2015 and 2016 which is 
consistent with the market swings referred to as cold and hot issue markets. Therefore, the 
earlier sub-period, 2010-2013, represents a cold issue market and the later sub-period, 2014-
2016, represents a hot issue market. Of the total sample size, 56 and 185 IPOs originate from, 
respectively, 2010-2013 and 2014-2016.  
 
Regarding the sample period, the years prior to 2010 have been excluded from the years 
observed. This exclusion was not intended, rather it had to be made due to the difficulty getting 
hold of the data needed to conduct this study. 
 
Variables and Data Sources 
Pursuant to the presented theory, we have used assets, sales and age as proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty (risk) and as measures for the changing risk composition hypothesis. These firm 
characteristics were also recognised to be used by Loughran and Ritter (2004). We will also 
look closer at an industry-related variable, biotechnological firms (biotech), which is added to 
the set of measures of the changing risk composition hypothesis. Lastly, data has been collected 
on all sorts of private equity (PE) ownership (investments into private companies characterised 
by active ownership (Invest Europe, n.d.)) at the time of going public. This variable is referred 
to as a control variable. More information is given below.  
 
Our primary source for finding IPO data was nyemissioner.se. This database was mainly used 
to track the firms that went public in first place. It also showed the year of the IPO and offer 
prices. Then, this data was double-checked by comparing it to the Swedish Tax Agency’s 
(Skatteverket) corporate history database and prospectuses. Moreover, the data was 
complemented by information from nasdaqomxnordic.com and aktietorget.se which are the 
official websites for Nasdaq Stockholm, First North and Aktietorget. For a few number of IPOs 
where information was missing or inconsistent, we collected data from various sources, 
including prospectuses. 
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Underpricing 
The level of underpricing is calculated as a percentage return using the offer price of the new 
issue and the closing price on the initial day of trading: 
 !"#$#%&'(%)'*+',-%.#"/'0&*1#"/'2-#34 − 6++4-'2-#346++4-'2-#34  
 
The closing price was collected from avanza.se (Avanza Holding AB). This is a raw figure and 
it has not been adjusted for market movements which sometimes has been made in previous 
studies on underpricing, e.g. Bergström, Nilsson and Wahlberg (2006).  
 
Assets and Sales 
Our source for asset and sales mainly comes from Retriever Business’ database, and all data is 
based on December 31 the year prior to going public. Assets and annual sales should be 
adequate proxies for risk, where firms with substantially lower assets and annual sales levels 
are considered riskier than firms with higher levels of assets and annual sales. When assets and 
sales are reported in a currency other than SEK, we used the cross-rate December 31 the year 
prior to the IPO obtained from Bloomberg Terminal to estimate assets and sales in SEK.  
 
When figures were missing, we used data from either the firms’ annual reports or prospectuses. 
When firms have a fiscal year other than calendar year, the assumption was that the change in 
assets and sales the coming fiscal year will be linear (and constant each month) to the difference 
between previous two fiscal years. Thus, our data of assets and sales are adjusted to December 
31 the year prior to going public. However, one implication with this approach is, opposed to 
assets that is measured at a certain point in time, that sales starts over from zero each year. Thus, 
compared to the true sales levels for the year we are interested in, our calculated figures should 
deviate.  
 
In the case of firms reporting on calendar year basis and having sales previous years but no 
sales in the latest year prior to the IPO, we reported sales as zero. Another minor issue is when 
firms had sales in the months prior to going public but annual sales were reported as zero in the 
latest annual report. Furthermore, for firms that were founded the same year as the IPO, we 
reported assets and sales as zero. Consequently, in all three cases it would appear as the firm 
had no assets and/or sales experience which would not be true. Thus, there are pitfalls in which 
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our data could be perceived as misleading and to some extent bias the results. Nevertheless, we 
did only encounter a few of these situations, and therefore, the effect should be minor. More 
importantly is that this approach caused our data to be consistent, with assets and sales based 
on December 31. 
 
Lastly, it should be noted that the different sets of principles, guidelines and standards available 
and accepted in accounting entails a homogenous error in this study. Moreover, since these sets 
differ and adding the fact that the practice of these allow for interpretations, financial 
information is not absolute which could lead to inconsistent data when comparing firms.  
 
Age 
Information on founding year comes from various sources. Founding year is defined as the year 
of incorporation of the original firm (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). This information is generally 
provided on the firm’s website. When this information is missing the founding year can usually 
be found in the corporate description in Bloomberg Terminal or in the prospectus. Age is also 
used as a risk measure, where younger implies more risk. It is calculated using the year of the 
IPO and the founding year: 
 74%-'*+'$ℎ4'!26 − 9*:".#"/'74%- 
 
Biotech 
Each firm in our analysis is categorised by industry and by sub-industry in accordance to 
Thomson Financial Securities Data under Business Info. Approaches have been made to 
account for industries with an expected high level of uncertainty. For instance, Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) categorised firms into tech- and internet-related owing to the Internet Bubble 
during 1999-2000 and used these, among assets, sales and age, as measures for the changing 
risk composition hypothesis. In addition, Ritter (1984) demonstrated that the high average 
underpricing during the hot issue market of 1980 substantially was attributed to the natural 
resources industry.  
  
Biotech firms are often heavily research and development (R&D) intensive firms which 
contribute to information asymmetry between the issuing firm and the investors. This is due to 
the absence of timely information on R&D activities and the high intangible assets relative to 
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tangible, and therefore, R&D-intensive firms tend to get systematically mispriced (Guo, Lev & 
Shi, 2006). This is particularly attributed to inadequate disclosure of R&D activities, 
presumably favoured by insiders, e.g. management and large shareholders, usually to not 
benefit competitors (Aboody & Lev, 2000). Thereby, heavily spending on R&D implicitly 
mean less disclosure, which would increase the uncertainty about an issue. Consistent with 
Ritter (1984), this implies that these issues may be more subject to underpricing since 
uncertainty and underpricing are expected to be positively related. Moreover, biotech firms are 
largely high-risk ventures and at the time of the IPO, they consist predominantly of a bundle of 
intellectual property and with usually no sales (Stephan, Higgins & Thursby, 2004). Therefore, 
we conjecture that, in line with the prediction from the ex ante uncertainty theory, R&D-
intensive firms are more likely to be underpriced than non-R&D-intensive firms due to less 
disclosure and the inherent risk associated with these issues. In other words, we suspect that 
biotech firms will be more underpriced on average than non-biotech firms. In addition, the 
assumption is also that biotech firms are younger and have lower assets and sales than average.  
 
Therefore, along with assets, sales and age as measures for the changing risk composition, we 
add the variable biotech which accounts for all biotech IPOs. Given recent hype in the biotech 
industry, e.g. Strandberg (2015), we predict an increased fraction of biotech companies going 
public during the hot issue market. Thus, by adding this variable, we want to examine the effect 
on underpricing of this line of business more thoroughly. 
 
Private Equity 
Regarding PE, we could not obtain any single source showing which IPOs were being backed. 
Rather, prospectuses and some supplemental information given on nyemissioner.se were used. 
Discovering that these prospectuses only showed the name of the owners and not the type of 
business, we manually looked up all owners with names2 that could indicate some sort of PE. 
Furthermore, the analysis was not restricted by any predetermined ownership share. Based on 
that premise, simply, if the issuing firm were subject to some sort of PE ownership, regardless 
of the extent, the firm is considered backed in our study.  
 
As noticed in other studies concerning underpricing, for instance Loughran and Ritter (2004), 
venture capital (VC) backing (private equity invested into young start-up firms (Invest Europe, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Names that included, for instance: ”investment”, ”capital”, ”kapital” (Swedish for capital), ”equity” and/or ”venture”.  
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n.d.)) is used as a control variable. However, they lack a detailed explanation to why it is 
included in the regression and an exact specification of what type of ownership it covers. 
Although, this is not to be interpreted as a shortage in their models. Firstly, pursuant to recent 
research, VC backing is known to have impact on underpricing, e.g. Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) and Lee and Wahal (2004). If the level of underpricing is lower for VC backed IPOs 
compared to non-VC backed IPOs, however, this is not completely clear-cut. Secondly, 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) among others used Thomson Financial (as of 2008 Thomson 
Reuters) as the main source to collect data on VC. This database for financial information 
should be trustworthy, wherein its classification of VC would not need further specifications.  
 
In addition to VC having impact on underpricing, such backing may as well be correlated to 
the other variables used in our setting, and by controlling for it, the risk of an omitted variable 
bias3 may be reduced (Clarke, 2005). However, as aforementioned, we could not find any 
source showing which IPOs that were backed by VC particularly. Recognising that 
prospectuses only showed the name of the owners (not the type of business) and in order to 
distinguish VC, we manually looked up all owners with names that could be related to PE. By 
doing this, another problem was encountered. For the greater part of firms (owners) found to 
operate with some sort of PE, and knowing that PE include VC among other subsets (Invest 
Europe, n.d.), the information given were insufficient to correctly classify the type of PE as VC. 
Consequently, the PE variable controls for all sorts of PE.!Furthermore, regarding the collection 
process of the data, a minor issue with the somewhat constrained approach is that there is a 
possibility that a few IPOs have been reported as non-backed even though they were backed. 
 
Speaking in terms of firms rather than capital, a PE firm and a VC firm are similar in many 
aspects. However, while both types of firms provide growth capital, VC firms usually invest in 
earlier stages of the private-company-life-cycle, in contrast, PE firms generally buy larger 
stakes in later stages (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013, p. 809). Furthermore, involvement of a PE firm 
or VC firm in an IPO may result in different effects in the level of underpricing compared to 
non-backed offerings, e.g. Mogilevsky and Murgulov (2012). Owing to this, it should be 
clarified that when controlling for all subsets of PE, this may be a minor shortcoming in our 
investigation. However, opposed to excluding it, we argue that it is more reasonable to control 
for it.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 A bias created by leaving out a variable that is relevant to the dependent variable and are correlated with at least one of the 
explanatory variables (Clarke, 2005). 
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Method of Analysis 
In order to analyse the data and to examine the criterions concerning the changing risk 
composition hypothesis, we will first report our results with panels. These panels will show 
both cross-sectional and longitudinal patterns. The former refers to comparing the same set of 
variables in a specific point in time, while the latter refers to comparisons over time. In these 
panels, however, the variables are not independent of each other. Taking this into consideration, 
and to examine causal effects more correctly, a regression analysis will be conducted. 
 
The first panel, Panel A, reports the average and the median values of first-day return, assets, 
sales and age for each year, the sub-periods and for the entire sample period. In addition, it will 
show the proportion of IPOs that are operating in the biotech sub-industry and which are backed 
by PE. Panel A also reports the total number of observations, sample size, excluded listings and 
excluded “real” IPOs where IPOs classified as missing are included. In the second panel, Panel 
B, each variable used as measure for risk are segmented into two risk categories. Assets and 
sales are divided by percentiles and age by median. Since we encountered a handful of firms 
that were very old, we argue that the median, rather than percentiles, is more suitable when 
segmenting the IPOs by age. Below the 25th-percentile and above the 75th-percentile denotes 
high and low risk, accordingly, below median age represents high risk and equal to and above 
represent low risk. In addition, average first-day return and the number of IPOs in each category 
is given. Panel B will also show IPOs classified as biotech and non-biotech, PE backing and 
non-PE backing and IPOs segmented by exchange.  
 
These panels will be used to examine all three criterions, primarily the first criterion. Regarding 
criterion two and three, however, we cannot draw valid conclusions from these panels since the 
variables are not independent of each other. Nevertheless, they may illustrate patterns which to 
some extent could reveal something about the changing risk composition hypothesis.  
 
Therefore, in order to examine criterion two and three we run three identical regressions, one 
for each sub-period and one for the entire sample period. Consistent with previous research, 
e.g. Loughran and Ritter (2004), first-day returns are used as the dependent variable. We 
include assets, sales, age and biotech as explanatory variables to test the changing risk 
composition hypothesis. We specify assets, sales and age as natural logarithms. Since the 
natural logarithm of zero is undefined, firms with zero assets or sales the year prior to going 
public are assigned SEK 1. Consequently, age is added with the value of 1 due to some firms 
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going public the same year they are founded. Biotech and PE are dummy variables that take the 
value of one (zero otherwise) for, respectively, biotech IPOs and some sort of PE backing. 
Moreover, the PE dummy is included as a control variable. The regression is: 
 9#-1$;(%)'<4$:-"== ?@ + ?Bln(F114$1)= + ?Hln(I%&41)= + ?Jln(1 + F/4)= + ?LM#*$43ℎ'(:NN)=+ ?O2P'(:NN)= + Q= 
 
where # denotes IPO. Generally, this regression tests whether risk (our risk proxies) can predict 
first-day returns. Particularly, criterion two is tested for by examining the signs on the estimated 
coefficients on the risk measurements in all three regressions. Criterion three is tested for by 
comparing the estimated coefficients given by the regression results in both sub-periods. Lastly, 
regarding the results, we will report significance levels of 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, however, we will 
only accept at the 5 % level in our analysis since we do not want to exert data mining.   
 
IV.! Results and Analysis 
In this section, the results are reported and analysed. We begin by presenting cross-sectional 
and longitudinal patterns, followed by a regression analysis in which we will examine the 
explanatory variables’ effect on first-day returns. Because of the findings, this section ends with 
a presentation of another factor that could be central to the higher underpricing in the hot issue 
market. 
!
Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Patterns 
Referring to Panel A and Figure 3 below, clearly, each year in the later sub-period contains far 
more IPOs than each year in the previous sub-period. This was known from the beginning of 
this study. Moreover, these figures are in line with the sectioning of the two sub-periods, where 
2010-2013 is referred to as a cold issue market and 2014-2016 as a hot issue market. Based on 
hot issue market characteristics, knowing that the number of IPOs almost tripled during 2014-
2016 compared to 2010-2013, the assumption was that each year and all years in 2014-2016 
should be subject to higher average underpricing than each year and all years in 2010-2013. 
However, as shown in the panel, 2014 had lower average first-day return than both 2011 and 
2013. To our surprise, 2013 was the year with the highest average first-day return during the 
entire sample period. Observing the sample size and the data input for each year, this finding 
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can be quite misleading; both 2011 and 2013 had low IPO activity, and therefore, offerings 
subject to very high first-day returns (also the case for very low or negative first-day returns) 
will have major impact when calculating the average first-day return. This is also the case, in 
2011 and 2013 two IPOs in each year can be seen as outliers due to their stock surging more 
than, respectively, 100 % and 70 % the initial day of trading. Hence, a more appropriate 
measurement might be the median. Comparing all years, still, 2013 had the highest first-day 
return, but the median return for 2014 exceeds the return reported for 2011. Notice that, if found 
and included in the calculations, “missing” IPOs could potentially have great effect on average 
first-day return for each year in 2010-2013. In contrast, comparing the sub-periods, the average 
underpricing for the hot issue market was 16.57 %, close to three times the average first-day 
return (6.02 %) for the cold issue market. Thus, the volume of IPOs especially and the higher 
underpricing should justify current sectioning of the sub-periods.
Figure 3. Sample-Number of IPOs per Year (bars) and Average First-Day return per 
Year (line) 
The sample includes IPOs listed on Nasdaq Stockholm, First North and Aktietorget. Listings that are not 
considered as “real” are excluded: spinoffs, parallel listings, firms that changed list, reverse mergers, mergers and 
preferred stock IPOs. Unit IPOs, REIT IPOs and IPOs classified as missing are also excluded. The sample size is 
241 IPOs for 2010-2016. 
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Panel A. Number of IPOs, First-Day Return, Assets, Sales, Age, Biotech and PE 
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Moving on to the variables used as measurement for the changing risk composition hypothesis, 
do the simple average and median figures reveal that more high-risk IPOs can explain the higher 
underpricing in 2014-2016? Eyeballing Panel A, the reported values do not support such 
predictions from theory. Recall that the premise of the changing risk composition hypothesis 
follows from high-risk issues being underpriced more than low-risk issues. Therefore, if there 
are periods where the fraction of riskier IPOs is greater than in other periods, the average 
underpricing should increase during these periods. We find that IPOs in 2014-2016 have higher 
assets and sales, both by average and median, and are older than offerings in the earlier period. 
In other words, offerings are less risky during this hot issue market. Hence, by only observing 
average and median values, there is in fact a negative relation between risk and first-day return 
and the changing risk composition hypothesis may not explain the difference in underpricing. 
However, for instance, this panel does not show the fraction of riskier IPOs, and therefore, we 
cannot draw any valid conclusions.  
 
The proportion biotech-related IPOs in the hot issue market was lower than in the cold issue 
market. Remember that the initial assumption was that a greater proportion of biotech IPOs 
would be observed in 2014-2016 and that these issues were subject to higher uncertainty, and 
therefore higher expected underpricing according to theory. The difference between the sub-
periods speaks against that an increase in the fraction of riskier IPOs should explain the higher 
average first-day return for 2014-2016. Lastly, not as important in this setting, is the control 
variable. Offerings with some sort of PE ownership were fewer by the number in 2010-2013. 
Although PE, especially the subcategory VC, somewhat signals more risk in this context, the 
small difference in the proportion backed IPOs between the sub-periods do not alter the patterns 
outlined above. 
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To examine the changing risk composition hypothesis more thoroughly, in Panel B, the IPOs 
are segmented into two risk categories where the average first-day return and the number of 
IPOs in each category is given. Then, we investigate if the average first-day return is higher for 
firms in higher risk categories and if the proportion of high-risk IPOs are different between the 
sub-periods. Lastly, we attempt to make more valid conclusions about whether the changing 
risk composition hypothesis can explain the observed average underpricing between the sub-
periods. In addition, this panel also shows offerings classified as biotech, having PE backing 
and exchanges.  
 
Consistent with Rock's (1986) winner's curse and the implication ex ante uncertainty, there is 
an overall positive relation between risk and first-day return for both sub-periods, except for 
Segmented by Return N Return N
ASSETS
Small 11.92% 15 19.98% 45
Large 3.25% 8 12.33% 53
SALES
Small -3.22% 15 18.64% 46
Large 2.67% 8 11.11% 52
AGE 
Young (0-8) 8.41% 34 24.53% 82
Old (>8) 2.33% 22 10.24% 103
INDUSTRY
Biotech 4.31% 13 3.19% 23
Non-Biotech 6.54% 43 18.47% 162
PRIVATE EQUITY
PE Backed 4.86% 26 16.80% 96
Non-PE Backed 7.03% 30 16.33% 89
EXCHANGE
Nasdaq Stockholm 0.10% 8 11.62% 42
First North -2.15% 14 15.52% 85
Aktietorget 10.78% 34 21.71% 58
2010-2013 2014-2016
PANEL B
Panel B. Average First-Day Returns on IPOs Segmented by Assets, 
Sales, Age, Industry, Private Equity and Exchange 
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sales 2010-2013. Therefore, especially assets and age could be seen as adequate risk proxies, 
where sales is less solid. This finding is contradicting to the overall negative relation between 
risk and first-day return seen in Panel A. In a demonstrative purpose, this positive relation 
between risk and first-day return is also shown in the last row. Segmented by exchange, even 
though IPOs on First North 2010-2013 are subject to lower first-day returns than IPOs on 
Nasdaq Stockholm, the figures illustrate an overall trend towards offerings being underpriced 
more on the exchanges designed for smaller growth companies, i.e. Aktietorget and First North. 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of explaining the higher underpricing in the hot issue market, this 
evidence is not persuading enough. Going back to the risk proxies, for both low-risk and high-
risk IPOs, the average underpricing is more severe in the hot issue market than in the cold issue 
market. This is not consistent with a stationary relation between risk and first-day return, which 
assumes that the relationship between the variables and average underpricing should be the 
same at all points in time. In other words, when risk is held constant the average underpricing 
should stay the same, and not increase, for each risk category. However, risk may not be held 
constant within each risk category. Furthermore, observing the number of IPOs in the high-risk 
categories, the proportion of high-risk firms going public during the hot issue market is less 
than in the cold issue market. In fact, the cold issue market was subject to more high than low-
risk offerings. Even if there is an overall positive relation between risk and first-day return, the 
higher average underpricing in the hot issue market may not be attributed to the changing risk 
composition of firms going public, because the relationship is nonstationary and neither did the 
fraction of high-risk IPOs increase. 
 
Surprisingly, firms related to the biotech line of business had lower average first-day return in 
both sub-periods than non-biotech firms. The largest difference can be seen for the hot issue 
market. In addition, biotech IPOs generate on average a weak positive average first-day return. 
Looking closer at the data input, the median age for all biotech IPOs is 6 years, which is lower 
than the median age 9 for all IPOs. Thus, our prediction that biotech firms are younger by 
median holds. Furthermore, these companies also have lower assets and sales on average that 
again justifies our assumption. Pursuant to a positive relation between risk and first-day return, 
this should imply a higher level of underpricing than the average underpricing of 14.12 % for 
the entire sample period, which evidently is not the case. Comparing biotech to non-biotech 
IPOs in both sub-periods and in the entire sample period, the same characteristics and results 
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are seen and obtained. This may imply that assets, sales and age, are inadequate measures of 
risk in this setting or that other factors outdo the effect of risk.   
 
Thus, rather than using firm characteristics, we further investigated this by using a post-IPO 
variable as a proxy for risk. Previous research suggest that risky industries are characterised by 
both higher levels of underpricing and greater variability (standard deviation) of first-day 
returns, e.g. Ritter (1984). Using the same proxy for measuring risk and based on our initial 
assumptions, we presumably should obtain higher standard deviation of first-day returns for 
biotech firms relative to non-biotech firms in both sub-periods, as a positive relation between 
risk and first-day return is expected. In the cold issue market, a higher standard deviation of 
first-day returns is obtained for biotech IPOs compared to non-biotech IPOs. Conversely, in the 
hot issue market, standard deviation of first-day return is significantly lower for biotech firms. 
These results are contradicting since risk and return are assumed to be positively related. This 
is violated in the first sub-period in which first-day returns are lower while the risk is higher 
relative to non-biotech issues. Moreover, using data from the entire sample period, we obtain 
that biotech firms have significantly lower standard deviations of first-day returns relative to 
non-biotech firms. As concluded above, this is in line with biotech firms being underpriced less 
than non-biotech firms on average. The cross-sectional pattern seen in 2010-2013, however, is 
contradicting. Also, comparing both sub-periods, the average underpricing on biotech firms has 
remained fairly constant, even though the relation between risk and first-day return has not 
based on standard deviation. As for biotech IPOs, neither does the positive relation between 
risk and first-day return seem to hold, nor is it stationary. 
 
Another explanation for this aberration might be the potential effect of PE backing. By 
assumption, the nature of this business is to generate the highest return on investment as 
possible. In other words, PE capitalists want to leave as little money on the table as possible 
when exiting an investment. Examining the data, more than 50 % of the biotech companies are 
backed with some sort of PE. Adding to this, there is a small difference in the average 
underpricing of biotech backed IPOs (4.9 %) compared to non-backed (5.9 %). This is in line 
with some previous mentioned studies suggesting that IPOs being backed by PE exhibits lower 
underpricing than non-backed. However, recall that all sorts of PE is included in this variable 
and that these sorts might have opposing effects, also between themselves, on the level of 
underpricing compared to non-backed IPOs. Hence, we are not in the position to completely 
propose that this difference in underpricing is consistent with theory. Nevertheless, both the 
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proportion of backed biotech IPOs and the difference in underpricing (4.9 % compared to 5.9 
%) are too small to account for the difference in underpricing between biotech and non-biotech 
IPOs in both sub-periods and to outdo any positive relation between risk and first-day return in 
2010-2013. In addition, eyeballing the next row in Panel B, there is only weak evidence that an 
IPO backed by some sort of PE matters in terms of underpricing.  
 
Regression Analysis 
As seen above, the cross-sectional pattern between assets and first-day return in Panel B can be 
perceived as a positive relation between risk and first-day return. The negative relation between 
age and first-day return also displays this pattern, where older firms are subject to lower 
underpricing. Surprisingly though is that biotech IPOs did not illustrate such pronounced 
relationship. However, the variables are not independent of each other. As an example, a 
younger firm is more likely to have lower assets. Accounting for this, we have conducted a 
regression analysis; one for each sub-period and one for the entire sample period. However, we 
do not expect that using this type of statistical model would alter the patterns that negates the 
changing risk composition hypothesis seen in Panel A and B. 
 
To understand the regression outputs and before analysing them, defining what the changing 
risk composition hypothesis predicts in terms of the coefficients on the explanatory variables is 
required. Recall that the explanatory variables are proxies for risk. Based on the assumption 
that 2014-2016 was subject to riskier IPOs (was not the case, referring to Panel A and B), if the 
risk composition of firms going public changes over time the variables will change, and by 
theory this will explain the higher underpricing. This also means that the estimated coefficients 
should remain approximately the same in both sub-periods, unless some source of endogeneity 
problem4 has different effects in each sub-period. In other words, if exogeneity5 holds, the 
hypothesis predicts a stationary relation between risk and first-day return. In contrast, if the 
coefficients changes over time, referring to section II Theoretical Framework and Figure 2 
illustrating the changing risk composition, this would affect the slope and result in a 
nonstationary relationship. Lastly, the sign on the coefficients for assets, sales, age and biotech 
must be consistent with a positive relation between risk and first-day return. Hence, assets, sales 
and age should have negative coefficients (the higher and older, the lower the risk), whereas 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 This problem arises when an explanatory variable is endogenous, meaning that it is correlated with the error term 
(Wooldridge, 2013, p. 848). 
5 Exogeneity means that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error term (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 848). 
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biotech should have a positive coefficient given the initial assumption that these are high-risk 
issues. If the variables are significant and if these factors hold, then confidently, we could 
attribute some part of the higher underpricing in the hot issue market to the changing risk 
composition hypothesis. 
 
 
The regression results do not speak in favour of the changing risk composition hypothesis. 
Starting with regression for the entire sample period, even though the negative sign on the 
coefficients on ln($%%&'%) and ln(1 + $+&) are consistent with the hypothesis, all variables 
(except for the ,-.'&/ℎ123445) are insignificant. Thus, we cannot provide evidence showing 
that these variables have an effect on first-day returns. In other words, assets, sales and age 
could be irrelevant to the level of underpricing during 2010-2016. This may be consistent with 
the fact that the offerings in the later sub-period were less risky offerings but had higher average 
first-day return, and vice versa for 2010-2013. Hence, we cannot conclude a positive relation 
between risk and first-day return. Furthermore, the ,-.'&/ℎ123445 is significant and has a 
negative coefficient, suggesting that biotech IPOs are negatively related to first-day returns. 
SAMPLE PERIOD
Variables 2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2016
ln(Assets ) -3.16618 0.1232655 -0.2417959
(-1.44)* (0.17) (-0.35)
ln(Sales) 0.4817679 -0.0244648 0.0473289
(1.00) (-0.08) (0.18)
ln(1 + Age) 2.3777 -5.032181 -2.762418
(0.39) (-1.99)** (-1.18)
Biotech -3.983565 -17.07889 -13.27841
(-0.29) (-2.57)*** (-2.00)**
PE -2.990083 2.664853 1.076222
(-0.3) (0.39) (0.19)
Constant 50.72334 27.37351 25.40295
(1.37)* (2.31)** (2.25)**
R2 0.025 0.024 0.0157
SUB-PERIODS
Table 1. Regressions on First-Day Returns for each Sub-Period and for 
the Entire Sample Period 
The table shows the regression results where first-day returns are used as the dependent 
variable. T-statistics are given in the parentheses. Significance level 1 % is denoted by ***, 5 
% is denoted by ** and 10 % is denoted by *. The regressions are run with robust standard 
errors. 
!
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This result is not in line with our assumptions nor is it with the finding that these IPOs were 
younger and had lower assets and sales than non-biotech IPOs. Nevertheless, it is consistent 
with the overall lower standard deviation of first-day returns than for non-biotech and the cross-
sectional patterns where these types of firms were subject to lower average underpricing than 
non-biotech firms.  
 
Overall, the regression results for the sub-periods do not alter the results reported for the entire 
sample period. The statistical insignificance of all variables in the earlier sub-period suggests 
that risk and some sort of PE backing are likely irrelevant to underpricing. In contrast, during 
2014-2016, both ln(1 + $+&) and the ,-.'&/ℎ123445 have a significant effect on first-day 
returns. The negative coefficient on the former is consistent with a positive relation between 
risk and first-day return and thus the changing risk composition hypothesis, whereas the 
negative coefficient on the latter is consistent with the observed substantial lower first-day 
return on biotech IPOs than non-biotech. However, by only having significant variables being 
negative related to first-day returns, there might be other components included in the error term 
which have opposing effects on the average underpricing during the sub-period.  
 
Due to the insignificance of all variables in the cold issue market, we cannot make valid 
comparisons between the sub-periods to further investigate criterion three concerning the 
stationary component. Even if all variables were to be statistically relevant to first-day returns 
in both sub-periods, all coefficients have changed over time. Moreover, all explanatory 
variables except for the biotech dummy have opposing signs in each sub-period. This 
nonstationary implies that the changing risk composition would fail to explain the higher 
average underpricing in the hot issue market.  
 
Even though ln(1 + $+&) in 2014-2016 and the ,-.'&/ℎ123445 in, respectively, 2014-2016 
and the entire sample period have a significant effect on average underpricing, if our variables 
are adequate measures of risk, the overall insignificance of the variables suggest that risk is 
likely irrelevant to underpricing over the entire sample period and in each sub-period. Hence, 
the regression analysis does not change the inference made from Panel A and B, where we 
could not see patterns of that the difference in underpricing could be attributed to the changing 
risk composition hypothesis. 
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Another Explanation  
As last resort, we have looked closer at our data set for other potential explanations to the higher 
average underpricing in the hot issue market. By looking closer at industries, the higher 
underpricing in 2014-2016 seems to be associated with IPOs within the information technology 
(info-tech) industry primarily. While most industries have first-day returns consistent with 
average for the entire sample period (14.02 %), with relatively small deviations, we found that 
IPOs related to info-tech are significantly more underpriced on average (32.98 %). Referring to 
Panel C below, adding up the other industries, these non-info-tech IPOs were underpriced on 
average with 10.92 %; being even lower than the average for the sample period. What is even 
more interesting is that, comparing the sub-periods, the proportion of info-tech related firms 
were not only substantially greater in the hot issue market they were also much more 
underpriced than in the cold issue market. In comparison to non-info-tech IPOs, the difference 
in first-day returns is almost absent in 2010-2013 (6.87 % compared to 5.96 %), whereas in the 
later sub-period first-day returns for info-tech firms are significantly higher (36.35 % compared 
to 12.59 %). 
 
Panel C. Information Technology IPOs Comparison 
 
Nevertheless, yet again, we cannot ensure that this finding can be attributed to the changing 
risk composition hypothesis. Although info-tech IPOs are riskier than non-info-tech IPOs and 
there is a positive relation between risk and first-day return supported by the lower average 
assets and sales and that the hot issue market saw a larger fraction of these, the positive relation 
SUB-PERIODS ASSETS SALES AGE
2010-2013 Sample Average Median Average Average Median
Information Technology 4 6.87% 13.08% 12,619 17,569 9.5
Non-Information Technology 52 5.96% 0.00% 472,334 165,537 6.0
2014-2016
Information Technology 31 36.35% 13.53% 101,137 144,849 10.0
Non-Information Technology 154 12.59% 6.73% 1,943,131 1,196,567 9.0
SAMPLE PERIOD
2010-2016
Information Technology 35 32.98% 13.53% 91,020 130,303 10.0
Non-Information Technology 206 10.92% 3.62% 1,571,862 936,307 9.0
PANEL C
Thousands of SEK
FIRST-DAY-RETURN
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between risk and first-day return is not supported entirely and the relation being stationary is 
not evident. 
 
Regarding the cold issue market, given the difference in assets and sales between info-tech and 
non-info-tech IPOs, this should imply a higher expected difference in average underpricing. In 
other words, the relation between risk and first-day return is positive indeed, however, almost 
non-existent. In addition, contradicting to assets and sales, if age is an adequate risk proxy, this 
variable does not support the overall underpricing difference between info-tech and non-info-
tech IPOs since the median age of info-tech IPOs are more or less consistent with the age of 
non-info-tech IPOs. Owing to this, consistent to when we investigated the biotech variable in 
Panel B, we looked at the standard deviation of first-day returns. Using this variable as a proxy 
for risk, the underpricing difference between info-tech and non-info-tech IPOs for each sub-
period and the entire sample period becomes more explainable. Regarding the entire sample 
period, info-tech IPOs are subject to much higher variability in first-day return than non-info-
tech IPOs. Furthermore, while there is little deviation in the first sub-period there is a huge 
difference in the second sub-period. This is more consistent with the difference in average 
underpricing between info-tech and non-info-tech IPOs, with a very small difference in the cold 
issue market and a much greater difference in the hot issue market. However, for instance, the 
variability in the first sub-period for info-tech IPOs are lower than for non-info-tech IPOs while 
info-tech IPOs are subject to higher underpricing than non-info-tech IPOs. Thus, the positive 
relation between risk and first-day return is still not completely distinct.  
 
Comparing the cold issue market to the hot issue market for both info-tech and non-info-tech 
IPOs, if assets, sales and age are adequate risk proxies, the risk has decreased but the return has 
increased. This is also seen based on standard deviation of first-day returns for non-info-tech 
IPOs. If standard deviation is an appropriate risk measure, this pattern is not seen for info-tech 
IPOs where the risk has increased and so the return. Thus, these longitudinal patterns are 
negating the changing risk composition hypothesis, due to the confusing relation between risk 
and first-day return but also the tendency of the relation being nonstationary since both info-
tech and non-info-tech IPOs are underpriced more in the hot issue market. Regarding 
nonstationary, however, risk is not held constant within the info-tech and non-info-tech 
categories. Lastly, to righteously reject the changing risk composition though, a regression 
analysis must be conducted.  
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Even if the changing risk composition may not explain this finding, the fact that info-tech IPOs 
in the hot issue market were both greater by the proportion and subject to significantly higher 
underpricing are in it itself interesting. IPOs related to this kind of business could actually be 
central to the higher underpricing witnessed during the hot issue market – but most likely in 
obedience to other underpricing theories. Furthermore, referring to a hot issue market based on 
underpricing, there seems to be that no such occurred for non-info-tech IPOs pursuant to the 
average underpricing of these. This finding is similar to Ritter’s finding (1984) where he 
demonstrated that the abnormal underpricing during the hot issue market of 1980 largely was 
attributed to the natural resources industry. In addition, the relation between risk and first-day 
return was nonstationary for IPOs related to this industry, however, opposed to our finding the 
relation was still pronouncedly positive. Finally, we will not proceed investigating this finding 
by testing for other theories. But, as outlined in this section, info-tech IPOs seems to be of 
importance with respect to the higher average underpricing during the hot issue market. 
 
V.! Potential Biases and Robustness  
The regression results and the overall insignificance, especially regarding the cold issue market, 
could be affected by or the result of potential biases. Such potential biases could possibly arise 
from, for instance, most likely a small sample size and/or omitted variables.    
 
The sample includes 241 IPOs, and in comparison to earlier studies, e.g. Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) and Ritter (1984), the sample size is very small. Furthermore, we are missing data on 30 
% of the “real” number of IPOs from 2010-2013. Another potential issue, to especially a small 
sample size, is extreme values, i.e. outliers or leverage points, in terms of first-day return or the 
independent variables. Not only will these have a large effect on the reported results in the 
panels, the regression estimates can be very sensitive to these as well (Rousseeuw, Peter & 
Annick, 2005, p. 8). Finally, there is the possibility of the regression model being subject to 
some source of endogeneity problem. Primarily, in our regression specification, this problem 
can arise as a result of omitted variables. If these left out variables are relevant to first-day 
returns and are correlated with at least one of the explanatory variables, then by not controlling 
for them the regression coefficients will be biased (Clarke, 2005). Therefore, we have four 
potential issues to deal with; a relatively small sample size, “missing” IPOs, outliers and 
omitted variables. Each issue is addressed below. 
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Sample Size 
By extending our sample period, the samples size would increase which in turn might change 
our results. However, as mentioned in section III, Data and Methodology, we have excluded 
the years prior to 2010. This exclusion was not intended, rather it had to be made due to the 
difficulty getting hold of the data needed to conduct this study. In addition, the data required 
could only be collected manually. Therefore, extending the sample period to reduce the 
possibility of any biases as well as robust testing our regression model would be close to 
insurmountable, and thus, this robust test will not be conducted. Even if we would proceed with 
collecting data from previous years, our results may be even more misleading (if they are now) 
owing to, for instance, the international financial crisis. Since we aim to test the changing risk 
composition hypothesis using “normal” years, the IPO market during 2007 to 2008 is not 
assumed to be representative and neither is 2009 which presumably was affected and still 
recovering from the crisis (Statistiska Centralbyrån [SCB], 2010). 
 
“Missing” IPOs 
One way to increase our sample without extending the sample period is to include IPOs that are 
classified as missing. Recall that these IPOs were ignored since offer price and/or initial day of 
trading closing price could not be obtained and, therefore, first-day returns could not be 
calculated. Moreover, 30 % of the “real” number of IPOs for 2010-2013 is missing. If calculated 
as a proportion of our sample size for this sub-period, these make up to 45 %. Considering this 
loss, the analysis and particularly the regression results reported for 2010-2013 may not be 
representative. A technique used to deal with missing data is imputation where missing data is 
replaced (Enders, 2010, p. 42). It should be clarified that excluding missing IPOs (listwise 
deletion), which have been done thus far, is also a technique to deal with missing data (Enders, 
2010, p. 39). As mentioned, however, this decreases the sample size and in turn most likely 
weakens the statistical power of the analysis. In contrast, imputation gives a complete data set. 
Thus, rather than deletion, we experimented with mean substitution where “missing” IPOs are 
imputed with the sub-period average underpricing. Among other imputation techniques, the 
choice of mean imputation was based mainly on the simplicity of using this method. In addition, 
offer price and/or initial day of trading closing price are assumed to be missing completely at 
random (MCAR) (Enders, 2010, p. 7). In other words, the missingness is not conditional on 
first-day return and it is plausible to assume that the missingness are independent of assets, 
sales, age, biotech and PE.  
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“Missing” IPOs in 2010-2013 are assigned with the average first-day return of 6.02 %. 
Consequently, 16.57 % will be used as first-day return for the “missing” IPOs in 2014-2016. In 
addition, consistent with our selection criteria, any “missing” IPOs being unit offerings or 
REITs are removed. The regression results are presented in Table 2 which can be found in the 
Appendix. 
 
Regarding the entire sample period, compared to the original regression, all variables become 
insignificant. Regarding the cold issue market, all independent variables are still insignificant. 
Recall that ln(1 + $+&) and the ,-.'&/ℎ123445 were negative related to first-day return in 
the original regression for the hot issue market, this is also the result when using mean 
imputation. Moreover, the coefficient on1ln(1 + $+&) is less negative whereas the coefficient 
on the ,-.'&/ℎ123445 is more negative. Although mean imputation caused one more variable 
(,-.'&/ℎ123445) to be insignificant, the overall regression results did hardly change. 
  
Interpreting the results, we cannot tell whether the results are more valid with mean substitution 
than using deletion. Furthermore, previous research and literature, e.g. Scheffer (2002), 
Donders, van der Heijden, Stijnen and Moons (2006) and Enders (2010, p. 43), demonstrates 
that using mean imputation causes more biasedness than other missing data handling methods, 
even when the data is MCAR. Pursuant to this and by not considering other imputation methods, 
adhering to listwise deletion of “missing” IPOs should generate more valid results. 
 
It should be clarified, however, that when first-day closing price could not be obtained due to 
the firm being delisted, this could be the result of the firm declaring bankruptcy. In turn, 
bankruptcy can be conditional on, e.g. assets and/or sales, thus, the data is not MCAR; rather 
the data is missing at random (MAR) (Scheffer, 2002). In this case, listwise deletion of 
“missing” IPOs may no longer be an appropriate method. Thus, in both situations, whether the 
missing data are MCAR or MAR, recent research suggest using a multiple imputation approach, 
e.g. Scheffer (2002) and Donders et al. (2006). This approach will not be tested since we lack 
the knowledge needed.  
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Outliers 
This section will cover outliers in first-day return, i.e. in the dependent variable. Examining the 
data, some IPOs have experienced extreme underpricing, both negative and positive. By 
assumption, due to the relatively small sample in 2010-2013, these IPOs will presumably have 
immense impact on the results in this sub-period. As aforementioned, regression coefficients 
are usually very sensitive to outliers, not to mention the panel results. Thus, we have used two 
similar methods to robust test our original model. The first method is called winsorization and 
the second is called trimming. The former is used to replace unusually large outliers with less 
large values and unusually small outliers with less small values, while the latter refers to 
eliminating outliers (Ghosh & Vogt, 2012). In other words, rather than dropping the outlier 
from the sample resulting in a smaller sample, winsorization downgrades the weight of the 
outlier. For both methods, we have used the 5th and 95th-percentile to classify outliers with 
respect to underpricing. IPOs subject to extreme underpricing, i.e. above the 95th-percentile of 
the sample, are assigned with the 95th-percentile first-day return or eliminated. Consequently, 
IPOs subject to extreme overpricing, i.e. below the 5th-percentile of the sample, are replaced 
with the 5th-percentile first-day return or eliminated. Lastly, regarding both methods, the 
calculation of percentiles is either based on the entire sample period, test 1, or the sub-periods, 
test 2. This generates two different samples, respectively, for the winsorization and the 
trimming treatment. The regression results are presented in Table 3, 4, 5 and 6 which can be 
found in the Appendix. 
 
When using winsorization for test 1, ln($%%&'%) becomes significant for 2010-2013. The 
negative sign on the coefficient is consistent with a positive relation between risk and first-day 
return. Regarding the regression results for the later sub-period, the ,-.'&/ℎ123445 variable 
stays significant but the causal effect is less negative. However, ln(1 + $+&) is no longer 
relevant. Lastly, no variable is significant when running the regression on the entire sample 
period. Moving on to the regression results when trimming is used. Compared to the original 
regression model, ln($%%&'%) and ln(678&%) are now significant for the cold issue market. The 
negative sign on the coefficient on ln($%%&'%) is consistent with a positive relation between 
risk and first-day return, however, the positive sign on the coefficient on ln(678&%) is not. 
Furthermore, the 9: value of 0.1842 is substantially higher than in the original model (0.025). 
Regarding the regression results for the hot issue market, there have been a shift in significance 
between the variables. Rather than ln(1 + $+&) and the ,-.'&/ℎ123445 as in the original 
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model, ln($%%&'%) and ln(678&%) are significantly related to first-day return. The former being 
negatively related and the latter being positively related. In this case, when the same set of 
variables are significant in both sub-periods, we can examine criterion three and say something 
about stationarity. First, the coefficients have changed over time, which indicate a nonstationary 
relation between risk and first-day return. In addition, the sign on ln(678&%) in 2010-2013 and ln($%%&'%) in 2014-2016 is not consistent with a positive relation between risk and first-day 
return. Moreover, the signs are opposing in each sub-period. Hence, pursuant to these variables, 
the changing risk composition hypothesis cannot explain the higher average underpricing 
observed in 2014-2016. Lastly, as with winsorization, trimming caused insignificance of all 
variables when running the regression on the entire sample period.  
 
When percentiles are calculated on the sub-periods (test 2) rather than the entire sample period 
(test 1), winsorizing the outliers leads to more insignificant variables. The only relevant variable 
in all three period-wise regressions is the ,-.'&/ℎ123445 for 2014-2016. The coefficient has 
a negative sign and it is less negative than in the original model. Furthermore, dropping outliers 
from the sample also caused more insignificance, however, instead of ln(1 + $+&) and the ,-.'&/ℎ123445, ln($%%&'%) and ln(678&%) are relevant to underpricing in 2014-2016. The 
sign on the latter is consistent with a positive relation between risk and first-day return.  
 
In comparison to the original model, using either winsorization or trimming results in higher 9:. Generally, this means that treating outliers improves our regression model since it better 
predicts first-day returns. In contrast, overall, these methods caused more insignificant 
variables. Lastly, being subject to a relative small sample size, it does not come as a surprise 
that 2010-2013 were most affected by outliers. In conclusion, the regression results suggest that 
our original model is sensitive to outliers, hence, it is not robust to outliers in first-day returns.  
 
Omitted Variables  
Having intercepts above the average IPO underpricing, we suspect that our original model is 
not perfect. It is plausible to assume that not all components trying to explain underpricing are 
negatively related to underpricing. Thus, the error term may include components which have 
positive effect on first-day returns. These omitted variables might as well be correlated to our 
variables used in the regression, if so, we are subject to biases and the reported coefficients do 
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not estimate true marginal effects and the intercepts would be inaccurate. This may also be a 
potential reason to the overall insignificance.  
 
Recall that the literature offers many theories and models to why underpricing occurs. Thus, in 
order to model an optimal regression, we need to control for these when testing the changing 
risk composition hypothesis, and most importantly, if they also affect our explanatory variables. 
In our original regressions, the relatively low 9: values imply that our model does a poor job 
to explain underpricing. Thus, adding any possible omitted variables may increase the 9:, and 
therefore, improve the model’s fitting to the data. However, due to the time constraint imposed 
on this study and the fact that such data requires to be collected manually, we have not 
proceeded with this robust test. Nevertheless, we believe that adding variables would only 
increase or decrease the estimated parameters and change the intercepts, but not the overall 
results. Even though panel data in general are not fully reliable to measure true relationships 
between variables, we argue that the patterns provided by Panel A and B are far too strong 
showing that the changing risk composition hypothesis is likely irrelevant to the higher average 
underpricing in the hot issue market. 
 
Finally, given all the theories being provided in previous research and current literature on the 
underpricing phenomenon, we believe that modelling a regression with a high 9: is nearly 
impossible. In addition, recognizing that the theories being provided are either similar, based 
on each other and/or extensions, researchers would find it difficult satisfying the exogeneity 
assumption in the first place. A solution to this is indeed a two-stage least squares regression, 
seen to be used by e.g. Loughran and Ritter (2004). However, sorting out the endogenous 
variable(s) ought to be too complex and too time consuming to resolve with in this study – not 
to mention to claim for its endogeneity among other variables. Thus, even though our original 
regression model is far from perfect, the results were consistent with the cross-sectional and 
longitudinal patterns.  
 
VI.! Conclusions 
First and foremost, consistent with previous research, this study shows that IPOs are 
underpriced on average. During the entire sample period, 2010-2016, IPOs on the Swedish 
stock market saw their shares surge on average 14.12 % at the initial day of trading. Moreover, 
IPOs during the hot issue market of 2014-2016 were subject to pronouncedly higher average 
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first-day returns than the four-year period prior to this period, where the difference was more 
than 10 percentage points. 
 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate this difference in underpricing between the cold 
issue market of 2010-2013 and the hot issue market of 2014-2016. Among other theories and 
hypotheses trying to explain swings in underpricing over time, the changing risk composition 
hypothesis was tested for in this paper. Having surveyed previous research and conducted this 
study, it does not come as a surprise that IPO underpricing is still mysterious. In a broader 
viewpoint, our results do to some extent amplify this puzzling phenomenon. 
  
Although the reported results, mainly in Panel B, showed some tendencies of a positive relation 
between risk and first-day return, which must be satisfied in first place in order to some extent 
attribute the higher underpricing in 2014-2016 to the changing risk composition hypothesis, the 
relation was nonstationary. Furthermore, if our risk proxies are adequate risk measures, the 
overall insignificance of these indicate that risk is likely irrelevant to underpricing in our 
regression model. More precisely, the regression results could not ensure a distinct relation 
between risk and first-day return. In addition, a larger proportion of riskier IPOs in the hot issue 
market than in the cold issue market was not seen, and therefore, the first criterion was neither 
satisfied. Thus, our results do not provide evidence that the changing risk composition 
hypothesis can serve as an explanation to the higher average underpricing in the hot issue 
market. 
 
However, to some degree, the results can be biased. Even if they are biased, we argue that this 
would not change the outcome. Moreover, the cross-sectional and longitudinal patterns shown 
were too strong providing evidence against the changing risk composition hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, opposed to Ritter (1984) and Loughran and Ritter (2004), we are not in the 
position to neither conclude that risk has effect on underpricing nor that it has no effect, and in 
turn either linking it to the changing risk composition hypothesis or rejecting it to the average 
higher underpricing in the hot issue market.   
 
Therefore, we looked for other potential factors in our data set and we found a component that 
could be central to the higher underpricing in 2014-2016; IPOs related to the info-tech line of 
business. In general, IPOs in this industry were subject to evidently higher average first-day 
returns than the other industries during the entire sample period. Adding the other industries 
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together, the average first-day return for info-tech IPOs was relatively consistent with the 
average (14.12 %) for the entire sample period. In addition, the proportion of info-tech related 
firms was not only substantially greater in the hot issue market they were also much more 
underpriced than in the cold issue market. Thus, referring to a hot issue market based on 
underpricing, there seems to be that no such occurred for non-info-tech IPOs. In other words, 
the higher average underpricing during 2014-2016 may be attributed to info-tech IPOs – but 
pursuant to some other underpricing theories rather than the changing risk composition 
hypothesis. This is only a vague inference, however, since it must be investigated more 
thoroughly. As such, an idea for further research would be to examine this factor.       
 
If the missing data on the “missing” IPOs could be obtained, it would be interesting to see 
whether adding these IPOs to the sample would have any implications in terms of results for 
this study, especially regarding the cold issue market where an abundance of IPOs were 
reported as “missing”. However, shown by the various robustness tests, the higher underpricing 
in 2014-2016 is still not likely to be attributed to the changing risk composition hypothesis. 
Regardless, we would still see this test made since it would increase the validity of this study 
and we could only hope for such further research to be made in the future. In addition, in order 
to obtain more valid results, we suggest that data on other underpricing theories and hypotheses 
should be collected and controlled for.    
 
Given the overall insignificance of our proxies for ex ante uncertainty, for further research on 
why IPO underpricing fluctuates over time it would be appropriate to challenge these proxies 
when testing for the changing risk composition hypothesis. Thus, it would be interesting to see 
if other common proxies for risk, for instance related to information found in prospectuses such 
as risk factors (Beatty & Welch, 1996) and/or how the IPO proceeds will be used (Beatty & 
Ritter, 1986), could be more adequate and in turn alter any results. Finally, a more general 
suggestion for studying the distinct difference in average underpricing examined in this thesis 
would be to test for other underpricing theories, but rather where adequate risk proxies are used 
as control variables. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2. “Missing” IPOs  
The table shows the regression results where first-day returns are used as the 
dependent variable. “Missing” IPOs are included through imputation. T-
statistics are given in the parentheses. Significance level 1 % is denoted by ***, 
5 % is denoted by ** and 10 % is denoted by *. The regressions are run with 
robust standard errors. 
!
!
 
 
Table 3. Winsorization Test 1 
The table shows the regression results where first-day returns are used as the 
dependent variable. Based on the entire sample period, an IPO is classified as an 
outlier if it had a first-day return below the 5th-percentile or above 95th-
percentile. Outliers are replaced with either the 5th-percentile or the 95th-
percentile first-day return. T-statistics are given in the parentheses. Significance 
level 1 % is denoted by ***, 5 % is denoted by ** and 10 % is denoted by *. The 
regressions are run with robust standard errors. 
!
SAMPLE PERIOD
Variables 2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2016
ln(Assets ) -2.552684 0.1545201 -0.0712786
(-1.65)* (0.41) (-0.21)
ln(Sales) 0.4347833 0.0123423 0.0603196
(1.27) (0.04) (0.25)
ln(1 + Age ) 1.579119 -4.895775 -2.712613
(0.37) (-2.08)** (-1.38)*
Biotech -2.645092 -17.35475 -12.1196
(-0.23) (-2.50)*** (-1.89)*
PE -4.871736 2.71574 0.0945625
(-0.65) (0.41) (0.02)
Constant 42.78601 26.02479 21.55975
(1.61)* (2.89)*** (2.78)***
R2 0.0241 0.0235 0.0130
SUB-PERIODS SAMPLE PERIOD
Variables 2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2016
ln(Assets ) -3.568143 0.3515613 -0.0010426
(-2.01)** (0.66) (-0.00)
ln(Sales) 0.5646198 -0.1020271 -0.00071163
(1.42)* -0.36 (-0.00)
ln(1 + Age ) 1.927257 -3.880818 -2.1781
(0.42) (-1.84)* (-1.12)
Biotech -5.17151 -11.92309 -9.127158
(-0.50) (-2.11)** (-1.77)*
PE -5.917241 2.65421 0.4994992
(-0.75) (0.63) (0.14)
Constant 59.76264 17.30209 17.45566
(1.99)* (2.06)** (2.12)**
R2 0.0567 0.0318 0.0167
SUB-PERIODS
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Table 4. Winsorization Test 2 
The table shows the regression results where first-day returns are used as the 
dependent variable. Based on the sub-periods, an IPO is classified as an outlier 
if it had a first-day return below the 5th-percentile or above the 95th-percentile. 
Outliers are replaced with either the 5th-percentile or the 95th-percentile first-
day return. T-statistics are given in the parentheses. Significance level 1 % is 
denoted by ***, 5 % is denoted by ** and 10 % is denoted by *. The regressions 
are run with robust standard errors. 
!
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Table 5. Trimming Test 1 
The table shows the regression results where first-day returns are used as the 
dependent variable. Based on the entire sample period, an IPO is classified as an 
outlier if it had a first-day return below the 5th-percentile or above the 95th-
percentile. Outliers are dropped from the sample. T-statistics are given in the 
parentheses. Significance level 1 % is denoted by ***, 5 % is denoted by ** and 
10 % is denoted by *. The regressions are run with robust standard errors. 
!
!
!
SAMPLE PERIOD
Variables 2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2016
ln(Assets ) -3.010863 0.3565547 0.0420794
(-1.58)* (0.69) (0.08)
ln(Sales) 0.4882466 -0.1356668 -0.0517142
(1.15) (-051) (-0.22)
ln(1 + Age ) 0.8389657 -3.844115 -2.276331
(0.17) (-1.85)* (-1.16)
Biotech -7.261034 -12.04766 -10.48415
(-0.63) (-2.18)** (-1.94)*
PE -4.072999 2.517134 0.9649929
(-0.49) (0.61) (0.26)
Constant 51.41327 17.87513 17.32971
(1.58)* (2.20)** (2.17)**
R2 0.0369 0.0337 0.0208
SUB-PERIODS
SAMPLE PERIOD
Variables 2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2016
ln(Assets ) -4.193463 1.104229 0.7014707
(-2.90)*** (2.92)*** (1.91)*
ln(Sales) 0.8613153 -0.586105 -0.3077285
(2.19)** (-2.49)*** (-1.47)*
ln(1 + Age ) 0.468675 -2.23804 -1.791627
(0.19) (-1.20) (-1.08)
Biotech -1.541458 -9.214828 -5.684015
(-0.20) (-1.69)* (-1.21)
PE -11.04795 3.706232 0.3962572
(-1.65)* (1.03) (0.12)
Constant 74.84152 3.866562 6.842298
(2.91)*** (0.67) (1.18)
R2 0.1842 0.0649 0.0230
SUB-PERIODS
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Table 6. Trimming Test 2 
The table shows the regression results where first-day returns are used as the 
dependent variable. Based on the sub-periods, an IPO is classified as an outlier 
if it had a first-day return below the 5th-percentile or above the 95th-percentile. 
Outliers are dropped from the sample. T-statistics are given in the parentheses. 
Significance level 1 % is denoted by ***, 5 % is denoted by ** and 10 % is 
denoted by *. The regressions are run with robust standard errors. 
SAMPLE PERIOD
Variables 2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2016
ln(Assets ) -3.04089 0.8563912 0.4981492
(-1.80)* (2.41)** (1.42)*
ln(Sales ) 0.5961939 -0.4846301 -0.3040959
(1.51)* (-2.09)** (-1.44)*
ln(1 + Age ) -1.732643 -2.877334 -2.06573
(-0.49) (-1.59) (-1.22)
Biotech -8.937058 -10.20013 -9.459169
(-0.88) (1.90)* (-1.90)*
PE -3.833795 2.504 1.132903
(-0.51) (0.70) (0.35)
Constant 55.68888 10.17551 10.87794
(1.85)* (1.92)* (1.99)**
R 2 0.0674 0.0606 0.0328
SUB-PERIODS
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Table 7. Sample 
!
Issuer Issue year Exchange Issuer Issue Year Exchange Issuer Issue Year Exchange Issuer Issue Year Exchange
Arise Windpower AB 2010 Nasdaq Stockholm Bufab Holding AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Hövding Sverige AB 2015 First North Enorama Pharma AB 2016 First North
Byggmax Group AB 2010 Nasdaq Stockholm Byggmästare Anders J Ahlström Holding AB 2014 First North Imint Image Intelligence AB 2015 Aktietorget Expres2ion Biotech Holding AB 2016 First North
Challenger Mobile AB 2010 Aktietorget C Security Systems AB 2014 Aktietorget Immunovia AB 2015 First North Fastout Int. AB 2016 Aktietorget
EcoRub AB 2010 Aktietorget Christian Berner Tech Trade AB 2014 First North Inission AB 2015 First North Finepart Sweden AB 2016 Aktietorget
Episurf Medical AB 2010 Aktietorget Clavister Holding AB 2014 First North Insplorion AB 2015 Aktietorget Gapwaves AB 2016 First North
Genesis IT AB 2010 Aktietorget Com Hem AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Ivisys AB 2015 First North Garo AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
Jays AB 2010 Aktietorget D. Carnegie & Co AB 2014 First North Karessa Pharma Holding AB 2015 First North Gasporox AB 2016 First North
MQ Holding AB 2010 Nasdaq Stockholm DDM Holding AG 2014 First North Kontigo Care AB 2015 First North GS Sweden AB 2016 First North
Pallas Group AB 2010 First North Dentware AB 2014 Aktietorget Magnolia Bostad AB 2015 First North Humana AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
Parans Solar Lightning AB 2010 Aktietorget Dextech Medical AB 2014 Aktietorget Maxkompetens Sverige AB 2015 First North Index Pharmaceuticals AB 2016 First North
PharmaLundensis AB 2010 Aktietorget Ecoclime Comfort Ceilings AB 2014 Aktietorget Minesto AB 2015 First North Internationella Engelska Skolan i Sverige AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
ScandBook Holding AB 2010 First North Envirologic AB 2014 Aktietorget Nanexa AB 2015 Aktietorget Invent Medic Sweden AB 2016 Aktietorget
True Heading AB 2010 Aktietorget Greater Than AB 2014 Aktietorget Nanologica AB 2015 Aktietorget Lauritz.com Group A/S 2016 First North
Vendator AB (Hubbr AB) 2010 Aktietorget Gränges AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Nilsson Special Vehicles AB 2015 First North LeoVegas AB 2016 First North
WntResearch AB 2010 Aktietorget Hanza AB 2014 First North Nilörn Gruppen AB 2015 First North Litium AB 2016 Aktietorget
ZinZino AB 2010 Aktietorget Hemfosa Fastigheter AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Nobina AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Maxfast Properties AB 2016 First North
5050 Poker Holding AB 2011 First North Igrene AB 2014 Aktietorget Nordax Bank AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Nepa AB 2016 First North
Arocell AB 2011 Aktietorget Inwido AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Nuevolution AB 2015 First North Nordic Water Proofing Holding A/S 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
Boule Diagnostics AB 2011 Nasdaq Stockholm Lifco AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Oncology Venture Sweden AB 2015 Aktietorget Paradox Interractive AB 2016 First North
Cefour Wine & Beverage Partihandel AB 2011 Aktietorget Motion Display Scandinavia AB 2014 Aktietorget Organoclick AB 2015 First North PEN Concept Group AB 2016 Aktietorget
Ecomb AB 2011 Aktietorget Nexstim Oyj 2014 First North Pandox Holdings AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm PiezoMotor Uppsala AB 2016 First North
Enzymatica AB 2011 Aktietorget NP3 Fastigheter AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Pexa AB 2015 Aktietorget Plejd AB 2016 Aktietorget
Finnvedenbulten AB 2011 Nasdaq Stockholm Oboya Horticulture Industries AB 2014 Aktietorget Pharmacolog i Uppsala AB 2015 Aktietorget Polygiene AB 2016 First North
FX International AB 2011 Aktietorget Optifreeze AB 2014 Aktietorget Photocat AB 2015 First North Provide IT Sweden AB 2016 Aktietorget
Kancera AB 2011 Aktietorget Oscar Properties Holding AB 2014 First North Prebona AB 2015 Aktietorget Raybased AB 2016 Aktietorget
Karolinska Development AB 2011 Nasdaq Stockholm Papilly AB 2014 First North Prime Living AB 2015 First North Redwood Pharma AB 2016 Aktietorget
Mackmyra Svensk Whiskey AB 2011 First North Peptonic Medical AB 2014 Aktietorget Quickcool AB 2015 Aktietorget Resurs Holding AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
MediRätt AB 2011 Aktietorget Phase Holographic Imaging Phi AB 2014 Aktietorget Saltx Technology Holding AB 2015 First North Rethinking Care Sweden AB 2016 First North
Moberg Pharma AB 2011 Nasdaq Stockholm PromikBook AB 2014 Aktietorget Savo-Solar Oyj 2015 First North Scandinavian Chemotech AB 2016 First North
ZetaDisplay AB 2011 First North Recipharm AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Scandic Hotels Group AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Seatwirl AB 2016 First North
ALM Equity AB 2012 First North Rootfruit Scandinavia AB 2014 Aktietorget Scibase AB 2015 First North Serneke Group AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
AVTECH SWEDEN AB 2012 First North Saniona AB 2014 Aktietorget Soltech Energy Sweden AB 2015 First North Shortcut Media AB 2016 Aktietorget
Brighter AB 2012 Aktietorget Scandi Standard AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Spectracure AB 2015 Aktietorget Simris Alg AB 2016 First North
Creades AB 2012 First North Scandidos AB 2014 First North Stillfront Group AB 2015 First North Sjöstrand Coffee Int AB 2016 Aktietorget
Gullberg & Jansson AB 2012 Aktietorget Scandinavian Enviro Systems AB 2014 First North TC Tech Sweden AB 2015 First North Sleepo AB 2016 Aktietorget
Latvian Forest Company AB 2012 Aktietorget Scandinavian Real Heart AB 2014 Aktietorget The Lexington Company AB 2015 First North Smart Eye AB 2016 First North
Medfield Diagnostics AB 2012 Aktietorget Sealwacs AB 2014 Aktietorget Tobii Technology AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Sweden Care AB 2016 First North
PlayHippo AB 2012 Aktietorget Sprint Bioscience AB 2014 First North Transtema Group AB 2015 Aktietorget Talkpool AG 2016 First North
Respiratorius AB 2012 Aktietorget Thule Group AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Troax Group AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm The Marketing Group P.L.C 2016 First North
RLS Global AB 2012 Aktietorget VA Automotive i Hässleholm AB 2014 First North Vibrosense Dynamics AB 2015 Aktietorget THQ Nordic AB 2016 First North
Spago Nano Medical AB 2012 Aktietorget Verisec AB 2014 First North Vicore Pharma Holding AB 2015 First North Vadsbo SwitchTech Group AB 2016 Aktietorget
Sportamore AB 2012 First North Zenicor Medical Systems AB 2014 Aktietorget Waystream Holding AB 2015 First North Videobur Sthlm Int AB 2016 Aktietorget
A1M Pharma AB 2013 Aktietorget A City Media AB 2015 First North Zenergy AB 2015 Aktietorget Volati AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
Arc Aroma Pure AB 2013 Aktietorget A Group of Retail Assets Sweden AB 2015 First North Absolicon Solar Collector AB 2016 Aktietorget Wilson Therapeutics AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
Emotra AB 2013 Aktietorget Alimak Group AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Academedia AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm Xbrane Biopharma AB 2016 First North
Immunicum AB 2013 First North Attendo AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Acarix AB 2016 First North Åacmicrotec AB 2016 First North
Kentima Holding AB 2013 First North Bravida AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Adderacare AB 2016 First North
Mindmancer AB 2013 First North Camurus AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Ahlsell AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
North Chemical AB 2013 First North Cantargia AB 2015 First North Aino Health AB 2016 First North
Platzer Fastigheter AB 2013 Nasdaq Stockholm Capacent Holding AB 2015 First North Alelion Batteries AB 2016 First North
ProstaLund AB 2013 Aktietorget Capio AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Alligator Bioscience AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
Recyctec Holding AB 2013 Aktietorget Cline Scientific AB 2015 Aktietorget Appspotr AB 2016 Aktietorget
Serstech AB 2013 Aktietorget CLX Communications AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm B3IT Management AB 2016 First North
SyntheticMr AB 2013 Aktietorget Collector AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Brinova Fastigheter AB 2016 First North
TiksPac AB 2013 Aktietorget Coor Service Management Group AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Bygg Partner I Dalarna Holding AB 2016 First North
Tourn International AB 2013 Aktietorget Corline Biomedicial AB 2015 First North Catena Media P.L.C 2016 First North
Absolent Group AB 2014 First North Dalsspira Mejeri AB 2015 Aktietorget Cellink AB 2016 First North
Advenica AB 2014 First North Dometic Group AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Cereno Scientific AB 2016 Aktietorget
Aha World AB 2014 Aktietorget Double Bond Pharmaceutical International AB 2015 Aktietorget Clean Motion AB 2016 First North
Alteco Medical AB 2014 Aktietorget Dustin Group AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Cognosec AB 2016 First North
Arcoma AB 2014 First North Eltel AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Crowdsoft Technology AB 2016 Aktietorget
Axon Kids AB 2014 Aktietorget Evolution Gaming Group AB 2015 First North Crunchfish AB 2016 First North
Bactiguard Holding AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Gaming Corps AB 2015 First North Cyxone AB 2016 First North
Besqab AB 2014 Nasdaq Stockholm Hoist Finance AB 2015 Nasdaq Stockholm Dignita Systems AB 2016 Aktietorget
Braincool AB 2014 Aktietorget Hybricon Bus Systems AB 2015 Aktietorget Edgeware AB 2016 Nasdaq Stockholm
